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Lawful Searches Incident to Unlawful 
Arrests: A Reform Proposal 
MARK A. SUMMERS† 
I. INTRODUCTION 
A search incident to a lawful arrest is one of the most 
potent exceptions to the warrant requirement1 of the Fourth 
Amendment to the United States Constitution.2 During a 
search incident to arrest, police may, regardless of the 
offense of arrest, automatically seize evidence unknown to 
them at the time of arrest and for which there was no 
probable cause (a usual requirement for exceptions to the 
warrant requirement).3 In other words, an officer can seize 
evidence incident to arrest for which a magistrate could not 
have authorized her to search. Because of its expansive 
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School of Law, B.A., Washington and Jefferson College; J.D., West Virginia 
University; LL.M. (International Law), Cambridge University. 
 1. See generally Barbara C. Salken, The General Warrant of the Twentieth 
Century? A Fourth Amendment Solution to Unchecked Discretion to Arrest for 
Traffic Offenses, 62 TEMP. L. REV. 221, 225 (1989). 
 2. U.S. CONST. amend IV: 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and 
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be 
violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, 
supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place 
to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized. 
 3. See United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 235 (1973). 
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nature, commentators have recognized the potential for the 
abuse of the search incident to arrest exception.4 
Recently, the United States Supreme Court has decided 
cases that expand the search incident to arrest exception and 
cases that restrict it. In one of the “expansion” cases, the 
Court refused to apply the exclusionary rule to evidence 
seized during a search incident to an arrest pursuant to a 
warrant that, unbeknownst to the arresting officer, had been 
vacated; in other words, an arrest without probable cause.5 
In the other “expansion” case, the Court refused to suppress 
evidence that was seized during a search incident to an 
arrest that was the fruit of a Terry stop made without 
reasonable suspicion.6 
In the “restriction” cases, the Court limited the 
automatic right to search the passenger compartment of an 
automobile in which the arrestee had been traveling.7 And, 
it required, absent exigent circumstances, a warrant to 
search the contents of cell phones seized incident to arrest.8 
This article will focus specifically on searches of the 
person of the arrestee incident to arrest. It will argue that 
the scope of the search of a person incident to arrest should 
be limited to evidence of the offense of arrest. The practical 
effect of this limitation would be to preclude searches 
 
 4. See, e.g., Wayne A. Logan, An Exception Swallows a Rule: Police Authority 
to Search Incident to Arrest, 19 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 381, 396–97 (2001). 
 5. See Herring v. United States, 555 U.S. 135, 146 (2009). 
 6. See Utah v. Strieff, 136 S.Ct. 2056, 2064 (2016). Since a prosecution may 
proceed despite the illegality of the arrest, there are few direct negative 
consequences to the police or prosecution that flow from the illegality of the 
arrest. See generally United States v. Alvarez-Machain, 504 U.S. 655, 664–70 
(1992) (reasoning that, while not performed in a way explicitly permitted, the 
extradition by forcible abduction did not prohibit his trial). What’s at stake in 
almost all of the legality of arrest cases is a collateral consequence, for example, 
the suppression of the fruits of the search incident to arrest, see Robinson, 414 
U.S. at 235, or a post-arrest confession, see Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590, 603–
04 (1975). 
 7. Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S. 332, 351 (2009). 
 8. Riley v. California, 573 U.S. 373, 402–03 (2014). 
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incident to arrest for evidence in those cases where, because 
of the nature of the offense, it would be impossible to find any 
evidence of the offense of arrest. 
The article will begin with an analysis of the Supreme 
Court’s decision in United States v. Robinson to determine 
whether there was any basis for its adoption of an 
unqualified, automatic authority to search incident to arrest, 
regardless of the probability of finding any evidence of the 
offense of arrest.9 It will analyze the pre-Robinson Supreme 
Court cases to see whether they support Robinson’s 
categorical approach to searches incident to arrest, and it 
will discuss other English and American cases cited and not 
cited in Robinson to ascertain whether there was a common 
law “evidence of the offense of arrest limitation” on searches 
incident to arrest. Part Two will examine the Court’s decision 
in Chimel v. California,10 decided only four years before 
Robinson. Chimel arguably provides the most support for 
Robinson’s categorical rule. Part Three will discuss two post-
Robinson Supreme Court cases which directly impact, and 
enlarge the scope of, police authority to arrest and therefore 
to search incident to arrest. Part Four will consider whether 
the Court’s two recent exclusionary rule cases may, coupled 
with Robinson’s categorical approach, provide even greater 
incentives for the police to arrest for minor offenses in order 
to be able to search incident to arrest. In Part Five, the 
article will focus on the Court’s two decisions that limit 
Robinson’s categorical right to search incident to arrest to see 
how they may bolster the argument for an offense of arrest 
limitation. The conclusion will argue for my proposed 
solution. 
  
 
 9. Robinson, 414 U.S. at 235. 
 10. Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752 (1969). 
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II. THE AUTOMATIC RIGHT TO SEARCH INCIDENT TO ARREST 
Willie Robinson was arrested by a police officer who 
knew that he was operating his vehicle with an invalid 
operator’s license.11 It was undisputed that there was 
probable cause for the arrest, and that in making a “full 
custody arrest,” the officer followed standard police 
procedures.12 The officer, after a “patdown” for weapons, felt 
an object but he “couldn’t tell what it was.”13 The officer 
removed a crumpled cigarette pack from Robinson’s pocket, 
felt there was something inside that was not cigarettes, 
opened the pack and removed fourteen gelatin capsules 
containing heroin.14 It was clear that, prior to the search, the 
officer had all the evidence there was of the offense of arrest 
because Robinson had given him his fraudulent driver’s 
license.15 It was also conceded by the government that 
extracting and opening the cigarette pack exceeded the 
permissible scope of a Terry frisk for weapons.16 
The D.C. Circuit’s en banc opinion in Robinson limited 
the right to search incident to arrest to evidence of the crime 
of arrest for which “the arresting officer has probable cause 
to believe will be found on the person . . . .”17 In cases of 
minor offenses, such as traffic violations, “no search of the 
 
 11. Robinson, 414 U.S. at 220. 
 12. See id. at 221–23 n.1–2. 
 13. Id. at 223 (quoting the officer’s hearing testimony). 
 14. Id. 
 15. United States v. Robinson, 471 F.2d 1082, 1094 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (en banc). 
 16. See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 16 n.12 (1968); Robinson, 471 F.2d at 1089. 
The Supreme Court has repeatedly stated that Terry does not permit searches 
for evidence. See, e.g., Arizona v. Hicks, 480 U.S. 321, 324–25 (1987). 
 17. Robinson, 471 F.2d at 1094. This article does not address the D.C. 
Circuit’s limitations on the right to search for weapons in those instances where 
a custodial arrest is pursuant to regulations and when the weapons search is 
limited to a Terry frisk. Both limitations were rejected by the Supreme Court in 
Robinson and its companion case, Gustafson v. Florida, 414 U.S. 260, 266 (1973) 
(holding that the unqualified, automatic right to search incident to arrest applies 
to discretionary custodial arrests). 
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person for evidence may be allowed at all because no 
evidence exists to be found.”18 
The Supreme Court reversed, concluding that there is an 
automatic, unqualified right to search incident to a lawful, 
custodial arrest for any weapons or any evidence, regardless 
of the offense for which the defendant was arrested.19 It 
reached this conclusion in part because in its prior cases “no 
doubt ha[d] been expressed as to the unqualified authority of 
the arresting authority to search the person of the 
arrestee.”20 Next, it said that it was not bound by “principles 
of stare decisis” because “[v]irtually all of the statements of 
this Court affirming the existence of an unqualified 
authority to search incident to a lawful arrest are dicta.”21 
Because there was no binding Supreme Court precedent, the 
Robinson Court examined other cases to determine whether 
they supported the Court of Appeals’ holding and opined: 
“While these earlier authorities are sketchy, they tend to 
support the broad statement of the authority to search 
incident to arrest found in the successive decisions of this 
Court, rather than the restrictive one which was applied by 
the Court of Appeals in this case.”22 This section of the article 
will examine in detail the Robinson Court’s analysis of, and 
reliance on, prior case law. 
  
 
 18. Robinson, 471 F.2d at 1094. 
 19. Robinson, 414 U.S. at 235. 
 20. Id. at 225; but see Trupiano v. United States, 334 U.S. 699, 708 (1948): 
A search or seizure without a warrant as an incident to a lawful arrest 
has always been considered to be a strictly limited right. It grows out of 
the inherent necessities of the situation at the time of the arrest. But 
there must be something more in the way of necessity than merely a 
lawful arrest. The mere fact that there is a valid arrest does not ipso 
facto legalize a search or seizure without a warrant. 
 21. Robinson, 414 U.S. at 230. 
 22. Id. at 232–33. The Court of Appeals had limited searches incident to 
arrest to “finding evidence which the arresting officer has probable cause to 
believe will be found on the person . . . .” Robinson, 471 F.2d at 1094. 
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A. There is No Doubt About the Unqualified Right to Search 
the Person Incident to Arrest 
In one sense it is true there is no doubt that there is an 
unqualified right to search the person incident to a lawful, 
custodial arrest. In none of its own cases cited by the 
Robinson Court was the search of the person incident to 
arrest invalidated.23 And the cases consistently affirmed the 
right to search for weapons that might be used to harm the 
officer or effectuate an escape.24 There was, however, in these 
same cases much doubt about how much searching could be 
done in the vicinity where the arrest took place.25 
Nonetheless, where the question was raised, there was 
virtual agreement that the scope of the search incident to 
arrest for evidence was not “unqualified.” It was limited to 
evidence of the offense of arrest.26 Despite this clear line of 
authority, the Robinson Court did not accept the “evidence of 
the offense of arrest limitation,” and it discussed in detail 
 
 23. See Robinson, 414 U.S. at 227–29 (citing Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21–22, 
24-25 (1968); Peters v. New York, 392 U.S. 40, 66 (1968)).  
 24. See, e.g., Preston v. United States, 376 U.S. 364, 367 (1964). 
 25. See Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 756–59 (1969) and cases discussed 
therein. 
 26. See generally Peters v. New York, 392 U.S. 40, 67 (1968) (quoting Preston, 
376 U.S. at 367) Preston v. United States, 376 U.S. 364, 367 (1964) (stating that 
one of the purposes of the search incident to arrest is “the need to prevent the 
destruction of evidence of the crime”); United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56, 
61 (1950) (noting “the longstanding practice of searching for other proofs of guilt 
within the control of the accused found upon arrest”); Harris v. United States, 
331 U.S. 145, 153 (1947) (stating “[t]he search was not a general exploration but 
was specifically directed to the means and instrumentalities by which the crimes 
charged had been committed”); Go-Bart Importing Co. v. United States, 282 U.S. 
344, 358 (1931) (condemning “a general exploratory search in the hope that 
evidence of crime might be found”); Marron v. United States, 275 U.S. 192, 198–
99 (1927) (similarly describing the search incident to arrest as for “things used to 
carry on the criminal enterprise”); Agnello v. United States, 269 U.S. 20, 30 
(1925) (describing what may be seized incident to arrest as “things connected 
with the crime as its fruits or as the means by which it was committed”); Carroll 
v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 158 (1925) (holding that searches incident to 
arrest are limited to evidence “which may be used to prove the offense”); Weeks 
v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 392 (1914) (describing the “right” to search 
incident to arrest for the “fruits or evidences of crime”). 
2019] A REFORM PROPOSAL 1423 
only one of its cases where the evidence of the offense of 
arrest limitation was imposed. 
In Peters v. New York,27 the Court found that a search 
incident to arrest for attempted burglary was justified in 
part by the “need to prevent the destruction of evidence of 
the crime.”28 The Peters Court held that the search was 
“reasonably limited in scope by these purposes” because 
“Officer Lasky did not engage in an unrestrained and 
thorough-going examination of Peters and his personal 
effects.”29 The Robinson Court described this statement as “a 
novel limitation” on an “established doctrine.”30 
It is clear that the Supreme Court in Peters was merely 
applying to searches incident to arrest the analytic 
framework for assessing reasonableness that it had just 
enunciated in Peters’ companion case, Terry v. Ohio.31 The 
Robinson Court eschewed this approach.32 But the Terry 
Court made it clear that its test for assessing the 
reasonableness of searches and seizures applies to arrests as 
well as Terry stops33 because both are seizures and searches 
subject to the Fourth Amendment.34 The Terry Court stated 
that “in determining whether the seizure and search were 
‘unreasonable’ our inquiry is a dual one—whether the 
 
 27. 392 U.S. 40 (1968) (a companion case to Terry). 
 28. Robinson, 414 U.S. at 228–29 (quoting Peters, 392 U.S. at 67). 
 29. Id. at 229 (quoting Peters, 392 U.S. at 67). 
 30. Id. 
 31. 392 U.S. 1, 16–17 (1968); see Robinson, 471 F.2d at 1092 (concluding that 
in Peters, “the Supreme Court applied [Terry’s] scope limitation principle to an 
arrest based search”). 
 32. Robinson, 414 U.S. at 228 (“Terry, therefore, affords no basis to carry over 
to a probable-cause arrest the limitations this Court placed on a stop-and-frisk 
search permissible without probable cause.”). 
 33. Terry, 392 U.S. at 20 (stating that “the notions which underlie both the 
warrant procedure and the requirement of probable cause remain fully relevant 
in this context . . . [i]n order to assess the reasonableness of Officer McFadden’s 
conduct . . .”). 
 34. See id. at 16–17. 
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officer’s action was justified at its inception, and whether it 
was reasonably related in scope to the circumstances which 
justified the interference in the first place.”35 This dual 
inquiry requires a court to assess not only the legitimacy of 
the seizure of the person, but also any search that is carried 
out as a result, and it is clear that if either crosses the line of 
reasonableness, its fruits must be excluded from evidence.36 
Applied to the facts in Robinson, the Terry test would have 
compelled the conclusion that the search for evidence was 
unreasonable because no evidence of the offense of arrest 
could have been found or destroyed. 
It is also difficult to reconcile Robinson’s rejection of an 
offense of arrest limitation with another Rehnquist opinion, 
Knowles v. Iowa.37 In Knowles, the Court refused to extend 
the unqualified, automatic right to search incident to arrest 
to traffic offenses where the driver was issued only a citation, 
even though there was probable cause and the state statute 
gave the officer the discretion to arrest.38 In finding that that 
state had not satisfied the “second justification for the 
authority to search incident to arrest—the need to discover 
and preserve evidence,” the Court stated: 
Once Knowles was stopped for speeding and issued a citation, all 
the evidence necessary to prosecute that offense had been obtained. 
No further evidence of excessive speed was going to be found either 
on the person of the offender or in the passenger compartment of 
the car. 
Iowa nevertheless argues that a “search incident to citation” is 
justified because a suspect who is subject to a routine traffic stop 
may attempt to hide or destroy evidence related to his identity 
(e.g., a driver’s license or vehicle registration), or destroy evidence 
of another, as yet undetected crime. As for the destruction of 
evidence relating to identity, if a police officer is not satisfied with 
 
 35. Id. at 19–20. 
 36. See id. at 18 (citing cases that have held that “a search which is reasonable 
at its inception may violate the Fourth Amendment by virtue of its intolerable 
intensity and scope”). 
 37. 525 U.S. 113 (1998). 
 38. See id. at 114–16. 
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the identification furnished by the driver, this may be a basis for 
arresting him rather than merely issuing a citation. As for 
destroying evidence of other crimes, the possibility that an officer 
would stumble onto evidence wholly unrelated to the speeding 
offense seems remote.39 
It is hard to see why this reasoning does not apply with 
equal force to Robinson. The difference between Robinson 
and Knowles is custody,40 but in either case the likelihood of 
finding evidence of the offense of arrest was the same—zero. 
B. Statements Affirming an Unqualified Authority to Search 
Incident to Arrest in the Court’s Prior Cases Are Dicta 
The Robinson Court used the premise that its prior cases 
were dicta, and therefore not precedent binding on the D.C. 
Circuit, as a springboard “to see whether the sort of 
qualifications imposed by the Court of Appeals . . . were in 
fact intended by the Framers of the Fourth Amendment or 
recognized in cases decided prior to Weeks.”41 Finding little 
or nothing in Founding Era sources such as Blackstone, the 
Court identified five cases which it concluded “tend to 
support the broad statement of the authority to search 
incident to arrest found in the successive decisions of this 
Court, rather than the restrictive one which was applied by 
the Court of Appeals . . . .”42 An examination of these 
authorities belies this conclusion, and an analysis of other 
English and American cases finds substantial support for an 
evidence of the offense of arrest limitation. 
The Robinson Court placed the most emphasis on a 
 
 39. Id. at 118 (emphasis added). 
 40. See Wayne A. Logan, An Exception Swallows a Rule: Police Authority to 
Search Incident to Arrest, 19 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 381, 433 (2001) (rejecting 
duration of contact between arrestee and police as “too indefinite and open-ended 
to qualify as a constitutional criterion” for when a custodial arrest has taken 
place). 
 41. United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 230 (1973).  
 42. Id. at 230–33. 
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nineteenth century Irish case, Dillon v. O’Brien.43 Dillon was 
a civil suit for trespass brought against the “peace officers” 
who had obtained the warrant for his arrest and who had 
arrested him and searched him incident to arrest.44 The issue 
in Dillon was whether the search incident to arrest rule 
applied to misdemeanors. The warrant authorizing the 
arrest of the defendant was for a misdemeanor common law 
conspiracy. When the officers arrived on the scene, the 
plaintiff was committing acts in furtherance of the 
conspiracy which included collecting rents, making records 
of the receipt of the rents, and possession of a telegram, all 
of which were evidence of a conspiracy.45 
At common law, and for much of the history of the United 
States, a judge could not issue a warrant authorizing the 
seizure of “mere evidence.”46 Warrants were limited to the 
instrumentalities and fruits of a crime, weapons that could 
be used to effectuate an escape, and contraband.47 A warrant 
protected the officer who executed it from civil suit.48 
Although there was a warrant in Dillon, the plaintiff argued 
that the officers were liable because an arrest warrant for a 
misdemeanor carried with it “no authority at common law to 
seize any property in the possession of a person charged with 
a misdemeanor.”49 
The Dillon Court distinguished searches pursuant to a 
warrant based on “mere suspicion” from searches incident to 
arrest upon “an allegation of actual guilt, and a lawful 
apprehension of the guilty party.”50 The Dillon Court placed 
 
 43. 16 Cox C.C. 245 (Exch. Div. Ir. 1887). 
 44. Id. at 247. 
 45. Id.  
 46. See Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 294 (1967). 
 47. See id. at 300–02. 
 48. See AKHIL REED AMAR, THE CONSTITUTION AND CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: 
FIRST PRINCIPLES 16–17 (1997). 
 49. Dillon, 16 Cox C.C. at 245. 
 50. Id. at 251. 
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the famous English case, Entick v. Carrington,51 in the “mere 
suspicion” category and Dillon in the “actual guilt” category 
(Dillon had been caught in flagrante delicto.): “The right here 
claimed is not to take all the plaintiff’s papers, but those only 
which are evidence of his guilt . . . .”52 Thus, when Dillon 
held that the search incident to arrest rule applied to 
misdemeanors it effectively incorporated the evidence of the 
offense limitation.53 
This portion of Dillon is, however, not mentioned in 
Robinson. Instead it quoted a vague statement which 
provides no clear support for the proposition that the 
authority to search incident to arrest is unqualified and 
automatic: 
But the interest of the State in the person charged being brought to 
trial in due course necessarily extends, as well to the preservation 
of material evidence of his guilt or innocence, as to his custody for 
the purpose of trial. His custody is of no value if the law is powerless 
to prevent the abstraction or destruction of this evidence, without 
which a trial would be no more than an empty form. But if there be 
a right to production or preservation of this evidence, I cannot see 
 
 51. (1765) 95 Eng. Rep. 807; 19 How. St. Tr. 1029. Entick and another famous 
English case, Wilkes v. Wood, (1763) 98 Eng. Rep. 489, both of which condemned 
general warrants and searches of private papers, were much on the minds of the 
founders at the time the Fourth Amendment was included in the Bill of Rights. 
AMAR, supra note 48, at 11; see also Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 626–27 
(1886) (describing Entick v. Carrington as a “monument of English freedom” 
which “it may confidently be asserted [was] in the minds of those who framed the 
Fourth Amendment to the Constitution”). 
 52. Dillon, 16 Cox C.C. at 251. Seizure of mere evidence, either incident to 
arrest or during the execution of a warrant, is analogous to the modern-day plain 
view doctrine. See id. at 248 (quoting Crozier v. Cundy, (1827) 108 Eng. Rep. 439, 
439, that stated that items not mentioned in the warrant could have been taken 
if they “had been likely to furnish evidence of the identity of the articles stolen 
and mentioned in the warrant . . .”). 
 53. See Dillon, 16 Cox C.C. at 250. At the time Dillon was decided, all 
attempts were misdemeanors. Limiting the search incident to arrest power to 
felonies would have resulted in the “absurdity” that, for example, in cases of 
attempted murder, “the right of the constable to [search for and seize evidence of 
the offense] would depend, not upon the commission of the act which results in 
death, but upon the victim having actually ceased to breathe.” Id. 
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how it can be enforced otherwise than by capture.54 
Presumably, the pertinent part of this quotation relates 
to obtaining the evidence by “capture.” But when placed in 
context, it is clear that the ability to “capture” evidence was 
limited to evidence of the offense of arrest.55 
The other cases relied on by the Robinson Court fare 
little better. In one, Holker v. Hennessey,56 the language 
quoted by the Court expressly affirms the common law 
evidence of the offense of arrest limitation.57  In another, 
Spalding v. Preston,58 the Court found that partially-finished 
counterfeit coins could be retained by the sheriff “for the 
double purpose of being used, as evidence, upon the trial of 
Russell, and also of preventing their being put in 
circulation.”59 Spalding thus stands for the unremarkable 
proposition that contraband may be seized incident to arrest 
and held as evidence, and that the state need not return it.60 
In a third case, Closson v. Morrison,61 the Court quoted 
 
 54. Id. (emphasis added). This excerpt is also clearly dictum since it was not 
central to the court’s holding that the search incident to arrest rule applied to 
misdemeanors. 
 55. The cases cited in the Dillon opinion also support the evidence of the 
offense of arrest limitation. Regina v. Frost (1839) 173 Eng. Rep. 771, 773 
(ordering return of money seized incident to arrest that was not evidence of the 
crime of treason); Rex v. Barnett (1829) 172 Eng. Rep. 563, 564 (ordering return 
of money seized from a defendant charged with murder because it was not 
relevant to the charge and not alleged to have been stolen); Crozier v. Cundy 
(1827) 108 Eng. Rep. 439, 439 (ordering return of items seized during execution 
of a search warrant which were not listed in the warrant and not related to the 
offense). 
 56. 42 S.W. 1090, 1093 (1897) (stating that “in the absence of a statute, an 
officer has no right to take any property from the person of the prisoner except 
such as may afford evidence of the crime charged”). 
 57. See United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 232 (1973).  
 58. 21 Vt. 9 (1848). 
 59. Id. at 10. 
 60. In Spalding the Supreme Court of Vermont reversed a lower court’s ruling 
in favor of the plaintiff in an action for trover. Trover was a common law cause of 
action for the value of property in the possession of another. Id. at 12. 
 61. 47 N.H. 482 (1867). 
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language containing the also unremarkable proposition that 
due to the safety of the officer and the public, incident to 
arrest an officer can seize and hold “any deadly weapon” even 
though it had not been used in the offense of arrest.62 The 
other language from Closson quoted by the Court also 
reflects another well-established principle of the common 
law rule of search incident to arrest—the authority to seize 
articles, including money, with which the prisoner might be 
able to effectuate an escape.63 Thus, there is nothing in 
Closson supporting a common law rule of unqualified, 
automatic search incident to arrest. 
The last case discussed by the Court in this portion of its 
opinion is People v. Chiagles,64 an opinion authored by then-
Judge Cardozo sitting on the New York Court of Appeals. In 
Chiagles, the defendant, who had been charged with arson, 
argued that papers seized from him incident to his arrest had 
to be returned. All his other papers had been returned, 
except those the prosecutor intended to use as evidence at 
the trial.65 In essence, the defendant was arguing that the 
“mere evidence” limitation which applied to warrants should 
apply also to searches incident to arrest. The court rejected 
that argument, stating that “[w]e find no support for a like 
restriction upon search incidental to arrest.”66 In language 
quoted by the Robinson Court, Judge Cardozo stated: 
Search of the person is unlawful when the seizure of the body is a 
trespass, and the purpose of the search is to discover grounds as yet 
unknown for arrest or accusation (citing Entick v. Carrington). 
Search of the person becomes lawful when grounds for arrest and 
accusation have been discovered, and the law is in the act of 
 
 62. Robinson, 414 U.S. at 231. 
 63. Id. 
 64. 237 N.Y. 193 (1923). One commentator noted that Chiagles “apparently 
lends some support to the position which the [Robinson] court takes.” Thomas C. 
Marks, Jr., United States v. Robinson and Gustafson v. Florida: Extending the 
Boundaries in Search and Seizure, 1975 DET. C. L. 211, 215 n.30. 
 65. 237 N.Y. at 195.  
 66. Id. at 196. 
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subjecting the body of the accused to its physical dominion.67 
Chiagles only bolsters the conclusion that the evidence 
of the offense of arrest limitation was part of the common law 
rule by rejecting the proposition that a lawful search could 
be made for evidence of crimes unknown to the arresting 
officer, while at the same time reinforcing that portion of the 
common law rule which allowed searches incident to arrest 
for “mere evidence.”68 
Thus, what we get from an analysis of the older cases 
discussed in Robinson is strong support for the common law 
rule permitting searches incident to arrest and seizures of 
evidence of the crime of arrest. An examination of other 
authorities not mentioned in Robinson only strengthens this 
conclusion,69 especially when no evidence of the offense of 
arrest could be found.70 The formulation in Bishop’s treatise 
is “typical”71 of the common law limitation on the scope of a 
 
 67. Id. at 197 (emphasis added). 
 68. See, e.g., supra note 46 and accompanying text. 
 69. See United States v. Wilson, 163 F. 338 (S.D.N.Y. 1908); Thatcher v. 
Weeks, 79 Me. 547 (1887); Smith v. Jerome, 93 N.Y.S. 202 (S. Ct. 1905); Thornton 
v. State, 117 Wis. 338 (1903); Regina v. Frost (1839) 173 Eng. Rep. 771, 773 
(ordering the return of money unrelated to the charge of treason); Rex v. Kinsey 
(1836) 173 Eng. Rep. 198, 199 (ordering return of items seized incident to arrest 
because “[they] ha[ve] nothing to do with the charge. [They] ought not to have 
been taken.”); Rex v. O’Donnell (1835) 173 Eng. Rep. 61 (ordering money taken 
from the defendant incident to arrest returned because it was not connected to 
the robbery charge. In summing up, the trial judge noted, “I believe constables 
are too much in the habit of taking everything they find upon a prisoner, which 
is certainly not right.”). See also JOEL PRENTISS BISHOP, NEW CRIMINAL 
PROCEDURE OR NEW COMMENTARIES ON THE LAW OF PLEADING AND EVIDENCE AND 
THE PRACTICE IN CRIMINAL CASES § 211 (4th ed. 1895); FRANCIS WHARTON, A 
TREATISE ON CRIMINAL PLEADING AND PRACTICE § 61 (8th ed. 1880). 
 70. See Leigh v. Cole, 6 Cox Crim. Cas. 329, 332 (Oxford Cir. 1853) (A 
defendant arrested for being drunk and disorderly must not necessarily “submit 
to the degradation of being searched.”); Bessell v. Wilson, 118 Eng. Rep. 518, 520 
n.a (1853) (Lord Campbell, the Chief Judge, strongly reprobated the city police’s 
invariable practice of searching arrestees. The plaintiff had been charged with a 
copyright violation and was arrested on a warrant to appear and show cause.). 
 71. This is how Justice Scalia characterized nearly identical language quoted 
from the 1872 version of Bishop’s treatise. Thornton v. United States, 541 U.S. 
615, 630 (2004) (Scalia, J., concurring). 
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search incident to arrest to evidence of the offense of arrest: 
The arresting officer ought to consider the nature of the accusation; 
then if he finds on the prisoner’s person, or otherwise in his 
possession, either goods or money which he reasonably believes to 
be connected with the supposed crime, as its fruits, or as the 
instruments with which it was committed, or as supplying proofs 
relating to the transaction, he may take and hold them to be 
disposed of as the court directs.72 
C. Chimel 
What we are left with is the Robinson Court’s reliance on 
Chimel v. California.73 At least superficially, Chimel does 
provide some support for the Robinson Court’s conclusion 
that there is no evidence of the offense limitation. The central 
issue in Chimel, however, did not involve the scope of the 
search of a person incident to arrest. Instead its focus was on 
the permissible scope of a search of the location where the 
person was arrested,74 a question on which the Court had 
 
 72. Bishop, supra note 69, at § 211. 
 73. 395 U.S. 752 (1969). The Robinson Court cites one other case, Adams v. 
Williams, 407 U.S. 143 (1972), to support its conclusion that there are no 
restrictions on the right to search incident to arrest. The main issue in Adams 
was the legality of the seizure of a weapon pursuant to a Terry frisk based on an 
informant’s tip. Finding that the seizure was legal and, therefore, that there was 
probable cause for the arrest for unlawful possession of a weapon, the Court 
concluded that “the search of [the defendant’s] person and of the car incident to 
that arrest was lawful.” Id. at 149. The search revealed heroin on the defendant’s 
person and in the car, a machete and a second revolver, all items falling squarely 
within the common law right to search for and seize contraband and weapons 
during a search incident to arrest. Id. at 145. Since the defendant had been 
arrested in a car with a gun based on a tip that he was a drug dealer, Adams does 
not involve a search incident to arrest where it would be impossible to discover 
any evidence of the offense of arrest. 
 74. The cases discussed in Chimel involved searches incident to arrest of the 
area surrounding the location where the defendant was arrested. See United 
States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56 (1950) (room where arrest took place); Trupiano 
v. United States, 334 U.S. 699 (1948) (distillery); Harris v. United States, 331 
U.S. 145 (1947) (four room apartment, including bedroom bureau drawer); United 
States v. Lefkowitz, 285 U.S. 452 (1932) (room where arrest took place, including 
desks, file cabinets, waste baskets and towel cabinet); Go-Bart Importing Co. v. 
United States, 282 U.S. 344 (1931) (office including desk and safe); Marron v. 
United States, 275 U.S. 192 (1927) (closet near location of arrest); Agnello v. 
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flip-flopped for years.75 In limiting the incident to arrest 
search to the grabbing area in the vicinity of the arrestee, the 
Court stated: 
When an arrest is made, it is reasonable for the arresting officer to 
search the person arrested in order to remove any weapons that the 
latter might seek to use in order to resist arrest or effect his escape. 
Otherwise, the officer’s safety might well be endangered, and the 
arrest itself frustrated. In addition, it is entirely reasonable for the 
arresting officer to search for and seize any evidence on the 
arrestee’s person in order to prevent its concealment or destruction. 
And the area into which an arrestee might reach in order to grab a 
weapon or evidentiary items must, of course, be governed by a like 
rule.76 
By using the adjective “any” to describe the evidence that 
may be seized incident to arrest, the Chimel Court appears 
to countenance a search for any evidence that could be 
destroyed and not just evidence of the offense of arrest. Of 
course, this is true if the value of the item as evidence is 
“immediately apparent” to the seizing officer.77 Chimel does 
not, however, authorize a general exploratory search for 
evidence.78 It was just this type of search that Chimel sought 
 
United States, 269 U.S. 20 (1925) (house several blocks from scene of arrest); 
Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132 (1925) (automobile); Weeks v. United 
States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914) (house and office). 
 75. Compare Trupiano v. United States, 334 U.S. 699 (1948) (disallowing 
seizure of distilling equipment found in the vicinity where the defendant was 
arrested), with United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56 (1950) (approving the 
seizure of counterfeit stamps after a thorough search of the defendant’s office). 
 76. Chimel, 395 U.S. at 762–63 (emphasis added). The Robinson opinion 
quoted this passage from Chimel. United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 226. 
 77. Horton v. California, 496 U.S. 128, 136 (1990). Only one of the cases 
discussed in Chimel involved the seizure of evidence unrelated to the offense of 
arrest where it was “immediately apparent” to the agents that the defendant’s 
possession of the draft board documents was illegal. Harris v. United States, 331 
U.S. 145, 149 (1947). 
 78. The police searched for and found in Chimel’s bedroom, far removed from 
where he was arrested, coins that had been stolen in a burglary, which was the 
offense of arrest. Chimel, 395 U.S. at 753–54. In this regard, Chimel is fully 
consistent with the existence of an evidence of the offense of arrest limitation. In 
all of the cases discussed in Chimel, the authorities were also searching for 
evidence of the offense of arrest. See Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. at 56; Trupiano, 334 
U.S. at 699; Harris, 331 U.S. at 145; Lefkowitz, 285 U.S. at 452; Go-Bart 
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to limit.79 
It is my position that the portion of the Robinson holding 
that extends searches incident to arrest beyond evidence of 
the offense of arrest was contrary to the common law rule 
and inconsistent with the Court’s prior decisions. Robinson, 
nonetheless, has been the law for nearly forty-six years.80 As 
commentators have opined since Robinson was decided, it 
substantially enlarged police power to conduct full-blown 
searches of individuals who are guilty of no more than a 
traffic violation.81 In the years since Robinson, two of the 
Court’s decisions have enhanced the police power to arrest 
and search even further. 
III. WHREN AND ATWATER: EXPANDING POLICE POWER TO 
ARREST FOR MINOR OFFENSES 
In Whren v. United States,82 the Court held that so long 
as there is probable cause to arrest, the subjective intentions 
of the officer for making the arrest are irrelevant.83 Thus, the 
motives of the officers in Whren (plainclothes vice officers in 
an unmarked car in a “high drug area”) did not make the stop 
for a minor traffic violation unlawful because the officers had 
witnessed the offense (making a right turn without signaling 
 
Importing Co., 282 U.S. at 344; Marron, 275 U.S. at 192; Agnello, 269 U.S. at 20; 
Carroll, 267 U.S. at 132; Weeks, 232 U.S. at 383. Moreover, Justice White’s 
dissenting opinion, arguing that warrantless searches of the type carried out in 
Chimel are almost always justified by exigent circumstances, is predicated on 
“probable cause to believe that seizable items are on the premises.” Chimel, 395 
U.S. at 773. 
 79. Chimel, 395 U.S. at 763 (“There is no . . . justification, however, for 
routinely searching any room other than that in which an arrest occurs—or, for 
that matter, for searching through all the desk drawers or other closed or 
concealed areas in that room itself.”). 
 80. Salken, supra note 1, at 244 n.156 (1989) (noting that by 1989, thirty-four 
states admitted evidence seized incident to an arrest for a traffic violation). 
 81. See, e.g., id. at 222 (observing that “a layman would doubtless be surprised 
to learn that police officers in most states may arrest and search virtually every 
adult almost at whim”) and sources cited infra note 127. 
 82. 517 U.S. 806 (1996). 
 83. Id. at 813. 
1434 BUFFALO LAW REVIEW [Vol.  67 
and proceeding at an “unreasonable” speed).84 Fortuitously, 
after pulling over Whren’s vehicle, one of the officers saw two 
large plastic bags of crack cocaine in his hands.85 
Contributing to the smell of pretext in Whren was the fact 
that Washington D.C. police regulations permitted 
plainclothes officers driving unmarked vehicles to make 
traffic arrests only when the violation posed an immediate 
safety threat.86 
In Atwater v. City of Lago Vista,87 the Court sanctioned 
a full custodial arrest for an offense punishable by only a $50 
fine because Texas law gave the officer the discretion to 
arrest for violations of a seatbelt law.88 There was also a 
whiff of pretext, or at least abusive police conduct, in 
Atwater89 where the complaint alleged that the arresting 
officer “approached [Atwater’s] truck and ‘yell[ed]’ something 
to the effect of ‘[w]e’ve met before’ and ‘[y]ou’re going to 
jail.’”90 True to his word, the officer handcuffed Atwater, 
placed her in the squad car, and transported her to the police 
station where she was booked. She had to remove her shoes, 
jewelry, eyeglasses and empty her pockets. She was 
photographed and held in a jail cell for an hour before she 
was released on a $310 bond.91 
 
 84. Id. at 808. 
 85. Id. 808–09. 
 86. Id. at 815. The Court went one step further in Virginia v. Moore, 553 U.S. 
164, 164 (2008) when it held that because there was probable cause, a search 
incident to a custodial arrest unauthorized by state law did not violate the Fourth 
Amendment. 
 87. 532 U.S. 318 (2001). 
 88. Id. at 323. 
 89. Id. at 346–47 (observing that “the physical incidents of arrest were merely 
gratuitous humiliations imposed by a police officer who was (at best) exercising 
extremely poor judgment”). 
 90. Id. at 324. 
 91. Id. The officer even denied Atwater’s request to take her children to a 
friend’s house. Fortunately, a friend of Atwater’s arrived on the scene to take 
charge of her three- and five-year-old children. Id. Who knows what might have 
happened to the children otherwise. 
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Atwater argued for a limitation on in-custody arrests to 
“jailable,” as opposed to “fine-only” offenses.92 The Court 
rejected her proposal because “[t]he trouble with this 
distinction, of course, is that an officer on the street might 
not be able to tell.”93 Justice O’Connor dissented and was 
joined by Justices Stevens, Ginsburg and Breyer. She argued 
that this case did not comport with the Court’s constitutional 
“reasonableness” requirement, pointing out that “[a] 
custodial arrest exacts an obvious toll on an individual’s 
liberty and privacy, even when the period of custody is 
relatively brief.”94 
Whren and Atwater significantly broaden the authority 
of the police to make arrests for extremely minor offenses so 
long as they have probable cause. They also foreclose two of 
the proposed limitations on Robinson’s unqualified, 
automatic right to search incident to arrest—suppression of 
evidence seized during pretextual searches and restriction of 
the power to make a custodial arrest for a minor offense.95 
But at least they both insisted that the arrest had to be 
 
 92. Id. at 348. The Court conceded that “If we were to derive a rule exclusively 
to address the uncontested facts of this case, Atwater might well prevail.” Id. at 
346. 
 93. Id. at 348. 
 94. Id. at 364. Justice O’Connor went on to detail the indignities 
accompanying a full custodial arrest: 
The arrestee is subject to a full search of her person and confiscation of 
her possessions. If the arrestee is the occupant of a car, the entire 
passenger compartment of the car, including packages therein, is subject 
to search as well. [After the Court’s decision in Arizona v. Gant, 555 U.S. 
332 (2009), the right to search the passenger compartment incident to 
arrest is no longer automatic. See, infra pp. 21–23.] The arrestee may be 
detained for up to 48 hours without having a magistrate determine 
whether there in fact was probable cause for the arrest. Because people 
arrested for all types of violent and nonviolent offenses may be housed 
together awaiting such review, this detention period is potentially 
dangerous. And once the period of custody is over, the fact of the arrest 
is a permanent part of the public record. 
Id. at 364–65 (citations omitted). 
 95. See, e.g., Salken, supra note 1, at 236, 248. 
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supported by probable cause. In two more recent cases, the 
Court has eroded this bedrock principle and thus further 
expanded the search incident to arrest exception in minor 
offense cases. 
IV. HERRING AND STRIEFF: SEARCHES INCIDENT TO 
UNLAWFUL ARRESTS 
Herring and Strieff are exclusionary rule, not search 
incident to arrest, cases. Nevertheless, by refusing to apply 
the exclusionary rule in circumstances where the arrests 
were otherwise illegal, they provide a further incentive for 
police to search for evidence other than that of the offense of 
arrest. 
In Herring v. United States,96 the charges against the 
petitioner stemmed from his possession of drugs and a 
firearm seized from him incident to arrest.97 The arresting 
officer found out that Herring had driven to the Coffee 
County Sheriff’s Office to retrieve something from his 
impounded truck. While there were no outstanding warrants 
for Herring’s arrest in Coffee County, the warrant clerk told 
the officer there was a warrant for failure to appear in 
neighboring Dale County.98 Based on that information, 
Officer Anderson arrested Herring. It is obvious that no 
evidence of the charged offense (failure to appear) could be 
found by a search incident to arrest. The search incident to 
arrest did, however, reveal methamphetamine in Herring’s 
pocket and a pistol in his truck (possession of the pistol was 
illegal because Herring was a previously convicted felon). 
Ten to fifteen minutes after the search, Officer Anderson 
learned that the warrant had been recalled but that the 
recall did not appear in the database.99 Thus, there was no 
probable cause for Herring’s arrest. 
 
 96. 555 U.S. 135 (2009). 
 97. Id. at 137–38. 
 98. Id. at 137. 
 99. Id. at 138. 
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Despite this lack of probable cause, the Court held the 
exclusionary rule should not be applied to exclude the 
evidence seized from Herring because the exclusionary rule 
serves to deter deliberate, reckless, or grossly negligent 
conduct, or in some circumstances recurring or systemic 
negligence. The error in this case did not rise to that level.100 
It was significant that “[t]he Coffee County officers did 
nothing improper.”101 Rather, “the error was the result of 
isolated negligence attenuated from the arrest.”102 
Given the Supreme Court’s frequent incursions into the 
exclusionary rule, paring it back to its core purpose, which is 
to deter police misconduct,103 the decision in Herring is 
unsurprising. In prior cases the Court had consistently 
declined to extend the exclusionary rule to actors in the 
criminal justice system other than the police.104 Herring is 
the first case where the rule was not applied to a police 
mistake, albeit a mistake “attenuated” from the conduct of 
the arresting officer, because the exclusionary rule is 
ordinarily reserved for cases of “flagrant” police 
misconduct.105 
In Utah v. Strieff,106 the arresting officer intentionally 
detained the petitioner to gather evidence without 
reasonable suspicion that he had committed an offense. The 
state conceded that the Terry stop was unlawful.107 The 
officer demanded the defendant’s identification and then 
 
 100. Id. at 144. 
 101. Id. at 140. 
 102. Id. at 137 (emphasis added). 
 103. United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 916 (1984) (holding that “the 
exclusionary rule is designed to deter police misconduct rather than to punish 
the errors of judges and magistrates”). 
 104. See, e.g., Arizona v. Evans, 514 U.S. 1, 1 (1995) (court clerks); Illinois v. 
Krull, 480 U.S. 340, 340 (1987) (legislatures); Massachusetts v. Sheppard, 468 
U.S. 981, 981 (1984) (judges). 
 105. Herring, 555 U.S. at 143–45. 
 106. 136 S. Ct. 2056 (2016). 
 107. Id. at 2060. 
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used that information to check for outstanding warrants.108 
He learned there was a warrant for an unpaid parking 
ticket,109 arrested Strieff for that violation and searched him 
incident to arrest, finding methamphetamine and drug 
paraphernalia.110 Again, it was obvious that no evidence of 
the unpaid parking ticket could be found during the search 
of Strieff’s person incident to his arrest. 
The Supreme Court reversed the Utah Supreme Court, 
finding that discovery of the warrant sufficiently attenuated 
the arrest and search incident to it from the illegal Terry 
stop.111 In a tortured opinion, Justice Thomas applied the 
attenuation exception to the exclusionary rule to the facts of 
this case.112 He identified the three Brown113 factors—
temporal proximity between the discovery of the evidence 
and the unconstitutional act, the presence of intervening 
circumstances, and the purpose and flagrancy of the official 
 
 108. Id. 
 109. Id. at 2060 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting). 
 110. Id. at 2060. 
 111. Id. at 2064. 
 112. Strieff is not an attenuation case and Justice Thomas was unable to cite 
any authority for the proposition that an unknown, pre-existing warrant breaks 
the chain of causation between the illegal act and the discovery of the evidence. 
The case he did cite, Segura v. United States, 468 U.S. 796 (1984), as he conceded, 
is an “independent source” case. Strieff, 136 S. Ct. at 2062. The Court applies the 
independent source doctrine when a warrant is obtained after and independently 
of the unconstitutional act. Id. at 2061. Justice Thomas could not, however, rely 
upon the independent source doctrine because it is inapplicable when the decision 
to seek a warrant is prompted by the illegal conduct. Murray v. United States, 
487 U.S. 533, 542 (1988). Of course, that is precisely what happened in Strieff. 
The officer discovered the warrant as a direct result of his illegal demand for and 
use of Strieff’s identification. 
 113. Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590 (1975). Brown, like the other attenuation 
cases, involved a confession following an illegal arrest where the issue is whether 
the confession is “sufficiently an act of free will” to purge the taint of the illegal 
arrest. Id. at 602 (quoting Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 486 (1963)). 
The Utah Supreme Court reversed Strieff’s conviction because it concluded that 
the attenuation doctrine was applicable only in situations involving an 
independent act of the defendant’s free will and that that circumstance was not 
present. Strieff did not defend that position in the Supreme Court. Strieff, 136 S. 
Ct. at 2061. 
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misconduct—which he applied to the facts in Strieff.114 He 
refused to apply the exclusionary rule because he found that 
two of the three Brown factors—intervening circumstances 
and purpose and flagrancy—favored the state.115 The 
intervening circumstance was the discovery of the pre-
existing arrest warrant, which was the direct result of the 
concededly illegal Terry stop.116 As for the purpose and 
flagrancy of the official misconduct, Justice Thomas 
characterized the officer’s conduct as “at most negligent,”117 
despite the fact that the officer “acknowledged” that “[h]is 
sole reason for stopping Strieff . . . was investigative—he 
wanted to discover whether drug activity was going on in the 
house Strieff had just exited.”118 In other words, the officer 
discovered the warrant through the exploitation of his illegal 
conduct, which is precisely what is condemned in the 
attenuation cases.119 
Justice Thomas concluded that “once Officer Fackrell 
was authorized to arrest Strieff, it was undisputedly lawful 
to search Strieff as an incident of his arrest to protect Officer 
Fackrell’s safety,”120 even though the officer admitted that 
his purpose was to find evidence of drug activity and that he 
“did not fear Strieff.”121 This was a search for evidence 
unrelated to the unpaid traffic ticket offense for which Strieff 
was arrested.122 It is curious then that Justice Thomas cited 
Arizona v. Gant and noted that it explains “the permissible 
 
 114. Strieff, 136 S.Ct. at 2061–62. 
 115. Only the temporal proximity factor went in Strieff’s favor since the search 
occurred only minutes after the illegal Terry stop. Id. at 2062–63. Arguably, the 
time factor alone should have negated any finding that the search was 
attenuated. 
 116. See id. at 2066 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting). 
 117. Id. at 2063. 
 118. Id. at 2066  
 119. See id.  
 120. Id. at 2063. 
 121. Id. at 2066–67 
 122. See id. at 2065 
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scope of searches incident to arrest.”123 As will be discussed 
in the next section, Gant allows searches of the passenger 
compartment of an automobile incident to arrest only when 
there is reason to believe evidence of the offense of arrest will 
be discovered, obviously an impossibility in Strieff.124 
Post-Herring and -Strieff, searches incident to arrest are 
lawful when the police mistakes which led to them can be 
characterized as only “negligent.”125 The resulting fruits of 
the searches, including evidence unrelated to the crime of 
arrest, will be admissible even though there was either no 
probable cause to arrest because a warrant had been vacated 
or when the grounds for arrest became known to the officer 
only as a result of an illegal Terry stop. The upshot, as 
Justice Kagan put it in her dissenting opinion in Strieff, is to 
“practically invite[]” officers to take the risk of stopping a 
suspect in the hope of finding evidence of a serious offense, 
given the chances the evidence will be suppressed are slim to 
none.126 And, as Justice Sotomayor so forcefully 
demonstrates in her powerful dissenting opinion in Strieff, 
the odds this will happen are high.127 Indeed, the “epidemic” 
 
 123. Id. at 2063. 
 124. See infra pp. 24, 26. 
 125. An issue that was not addressed in either Herring or Strieff is how to 
square their negligence standards with the Fourth Amendment’s prohibition of 
“unreasonable” searches and seizures, since negligent conduct is by definition 
unreasonable conduct. See BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1245 (11th ed. 2019) 
(“Negligence: The failure to exercise the standard of care that a reasonably 
prudent person would have exercised in a similar situation . . . .”). 
 126. See Strieff, 136 S. Ct. at 2073–74 (Kagan, J., dissenting). 
 127. Id. at 2068–69 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting). Not surprisingly, Strieff has 
generated scholarly criticism. See, e.g., Julian A. Cook III, The Wrong Decision at 
the Wrong Time: Utah v. Strieff in the Era of Aggressive Policing, 70 SMU L. REV. 
293 (2017); George M. Derry III, Allowing “Lawless Police Conduct” in Order to 
Forbid “Lawless Civilian Conduct”: The Court Further Erodes the Exclusionary 
Rule in Utah v. Strieff, 44 HASTINGS CONST. L. Q. 393 (2017); Katherine A. 
Macfarlane, Predicting Utah v. Strieff’s Civil Rights Impact, 126 YALE L. J. F. 139 
(2016); Guy Padula, Utah v. Strieff: Lemonade Stands and Dragnet Policing, 120 
W. VA. L. REV. 469 (2017); Josephine Ross, Warning: Stop-and-Frisk May Be 
Hazardous to Your Health, 25 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 689 (2016); Emily J. Sack, 
Illegal Stops and the Exclusionary Rule: The Consequences of Utah v. Strieff, 22 
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of arrests for minor offenses which the Atwater Court was 
unable to foresee in 2001 has arrived.128 
V. GANT AND RILEY: REINING IN SEARCHES INCIDENT TO 
ARREST 
In Arizona v. Gant,129 the Court rejected the categorical 
approach to the search of passenger compartments of 
automobiles that it had adopted in New York v. Belton.130 
Belton was the adaptation of Chimel’s “grabbing distance” 
rule to automobiles.131 Belton held that because items in the 
passenger compartment are “inevitably” within the grabbing 
distance of an arrestee, “when an officer lawfully arrests ‘the 
occupant of an automobile, he may, as a contemporaneous 
incident of that arrest, search the passenger compartment of 
the automobile’ and any containers therein.” 132 Gant 
overturned this portion of Belton and limited the search 
incident to arrest of the passenger compartment to those 
instances “when it is ‘reasonable to believe evidence relevant 
to the crime of arrest might be found in the vehicle.’”133 As 
the Gant Court straightforwardly acknowledged, “when a 
recent occupant is arrested for a traffic violation, there will 
be no reasonable basis to believe the vehicle contains 
relevant evidence.”134 
 
ROGER WILLIAMS U. L. REV. 263 (2017); Nirej Sekhon, Dangerous Warrants, 93 
WASH. L. REV. 967 (2018). 
 128. Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318, 353 (2001). For the supporting 
statistics, see infra note 150. 
 129. 556 U.S. 332 (2009). 
 130. Id. at 335 (citing New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454 (1981)).  
 131. Id. 
 132. Id. at 340–41 (quoting Belton). Although the four defendants in Belton had 
been arrested, they were not handcuffed but had been separated from one 
another and the car in which they had been traveling. Id. at 339. 
 133. Id. at 343 (quoting Thornton v. United States, 541 U.S. 615, 632 (2004) 
(Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment)). Belton still applies “when the arrestee 
is unsecured and within reaching distance of the passenger compartment at the 
time of the search.” Id. 
 134. Id. at 343–44 (citing as examples, Atwater, 532 U.S. at 324 and Knowles, 
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The road to Gant started in Justice Scalia’s concurring 
opinion in Thornton v. United States.135 While he eviscerated 
the rationales for Belton,136 Justice Scalia concurred in the 
judgment in Thornton, even though its “effort to apply our 
current doctrine to this search stretches it beyond its 
breaking point . . . .”137 After reviewing the authorities, 
Justice Scalia concluded that the Court had followed two 
different approaches to searches incident to arrest—
Robinson, where the fact of arrest alone justifies the search, 
and Rabinowitz, where there was a reasonable belief that 
evidence of the offense of arrest would be found.138 He went 
on to state: 
The two different rules make sense: When officer safety or 
imminent evidence concealment or destruction is at issue, officers 
should not have to make fine judgments in the heat of the moment. 
But in the context of a general evidence-gathering search, the state 
interests that might justify any overbreadth are far less compelling. 
A motorist may be arrested for a wide variety of offenses; in many 
cases, there is no reasonable basis to believe relevant evidence 
might be found in the car. [citations omitted] I would therefore 
limit Belton searches to cases where it is reasonable to believe 
evidence relevant to the crime of arrest might be found in the 
vehicle.139 
Justice Scalia’s analysis applies equally to the search of 
one’s person when the arrest is supported only by a warrant 
charging a traffic offense. 
 
525 U.S. at 118). 
 135. See 541 U.S. 615, 625 (2004) (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment). 
 136. See id. at 625–29. 
 137. Id. at 625. The police wanted to stop Thornton’s car because the license 
plates belonged to another vehicle. Before they could reach him, Thornton had 
gotten out of the car and was standing nearby. The officer asked Thornton for 
permission to pat him down and felt a bulge. When he was asked whether he had 
any narcotics, Thornton removed bags from his pocket containing marijuana and 
crack cocaine. He was arrested, handcuffed and placed in the patrol car. His car 
was searched and a nine-millimeter handgun was discovered. Id. at 618. Belton 
was applied because the arrestee was a “recent occupant” of the vehicle. Id. at 
623–24. 
 138. Id. at 631–32. 
 139. Id. at 632 (emphasis added). 
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In Riley v. California,140 the Court placed limitations on 
Robinson’s unqualified, automatic right to search cell phones 
seized incident to arrest. Observing that Robinson is “the 
only decision from this Court applying Chimel to a search of 
the contents of an item found on an arrestee’s person,”141 the 
Court rejected Robinson’s central premise that the mere fact 
of custody justifies any search, citing Chimel as an 
example.142 The Court also refused to apply Gant to permit 
warrantless searches of cell phones because, while “Gant 
restricts broad searches resulting from minor crimes such as 
traffic violations,” “[i]t would be a particularly inexperienced 
or unimaginative law enforcement officer who could not come 
up with several reasons to suppose evidence of just about any 
crime could be found on a cell phone.”143 Chief Justice 
Roberts also accepted the fact that the Court’s decision might 
result in the loss of some “valuable incriminating 
information about dangerous criminals” but that is because 
“[p]rivacy comes at a cost.”144 Thus, absent some other “case 
specific” exception to the warrant requirement, “[o]ur answer 
to the question of what police must do before searching a cell 
phone seized incident to an arrest is accordingly simple—get 
a warrant.”145 
Gant and Riley represent clear inroads into Robinson’s 
unqualified, automatic authority to search incident to arrest. 
That authority is no longer automatic and no longer 
unqualified. 
  
 
 140. 573 U.S. 373 (2014). 
 141. Id. at 392. 
 142. See id. The Riley Court did reaffirm Robinson’s categorical rule when it 
comes to the search of physical objects. See id. at 386. 
 143. Id. at 399. 
 144. Id. at 401. 
 145. Id. at 403. The “case specific” exceptions require an evidentiary 
justification and thus are not “automatic.” See id. at 402. 
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VI. CONCLUSION 
There are several reasons that searches incident to 
arrest should be limited to the offense of arrest. 
First, the evidence of offense of arrest limitation reflects 
the common law rule and the understanding of the right to 
search incident to arrest at the time the Fourth Amendment 
was adopted.146 As the analysis of the cases cited in Robinson 
and other cases not mentioned by the Robinson Court 
demonstrated, there was clear authority, which Robinson 
ignored, that the common law understanding of the 
authority to search incident to arrest included the offense of 
arrest limitation.147 Accordingly, the conclusion of the 
Robinson Court that the authorities supported an 
unqualified right to search incident to arrest was unfounded. 
Furthermore, searches incident to arrest other than for 
evidence of the offense of arrest rest on dubious theoretical 
grounds. The Supreme Court does not permit Terry searches 
for evidence because the justification for the Terry pat down 
is the officer’s reasonable suspicion “criminal activity may be 
afoot,” and that the suspect is armed and dangerous.148 The 
officer does not have reasonable suspicion to believe that 
evidence of a crime will be found because no crime has yet 
been committed. When, however, there is probable cause to 
believe a crime has been committed, it is reasonable for the 
officer to believe that evidence of the offense will be found on, 
 
 146.  
In reading the Amendment, we are guided by “the traditional protections 
against unreasonable searches and seizures afforded by the common law 
at the time of the framing,” since “[a]n examination of the common-law 
understanding of an officer’s authority to arrest sheds light on the 
obviously relevant, if not entirely dispositive, consideration of what the 
Framers of the Amendment might have thought to be reasonable.” 
Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318, 326 (2001) (first quoting Wilson v. 
Arkansas, 514 U.S. 927, 931 (1995); and then quoting Payton v. New York, 445 
U.S. 573, 591 (1980)). 
 147. See, e.g., supra notes 69, 70 & 72. 
 148. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. at 30–31. 
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or in the near vicinity of, the offender.149 Searches incident 
to arrest for evidence unrelated to the offense of arrest 
should be prohibited because, like Terry searches for 
evidence, there is no reason to believe such evidence will be 
found. 
Next, Robinson and the post-Robinson cases, Whren, 
Atwater, Herring and Strieff, provide powerful incentives for 
the police to stop individuals who have committed only a 
minor offense in order to search, hoping to find evidence of a 
more serious crime.150 In combination, these cases represent 
a “get-out-of-jail-free-card” for the police who can stop and 
search for any offense, no matter how minor, and their 
motives for doing so cannot be questioned. Even where there 
is no basis for the stop, if they find incriminating evidence 
during a search, it will not be suppressed so long as there is 
a warrant somewhere, even one that is invalid. If they find 
nothing or there is no warrant, they pat the citizen on the 
back and send him on his way, secure in the belief that there 
will be no adverse consequences. 
Unfortunately, a large number of these police-citizen 
encounters have racial overtones and disproportionately 
impact minority communities.151 While, obviously, this is a 
 
 149. See Thornton v. United States, 541 U.S. 615, 632 (2004) (Scalia, J., 
concurring in the judgment); Marks, supra note 64, at 213 n.16 (noting that 
probable cause is “almost always provided by the circumstances of the arrest 
itself”). 
 150. Logan, supra note 4, at 402–03 (“[T]he synergy of Knowles and Whren, 
combined with expansive police authority to arrest for minor offenses, is now 
manifesting itself on the nation’s streets.”). Professor Logan made this 
observation before the Court’s decisions in Herring and Strieff. If anything, the 
situation is now far worse as the statistics cited in Justice Sotomayor’s dissenting 
opinion in Strieff prove—180,000 misdemeanor warrants in Utah’s database. 
Utah v. Strieff, 136 S. Ct. 2056, 2066 (2016). There are also 7.8 million 
outstanding warrants in the United States “the vast majority of which appear to 
be for minor offenses.” Id. at 2068. There are 16,000 outstanding warrants out of 
a population of 21,000 in Ferguson, Missouri. Id. There are 20,000 arrests in New 
Orleans in one year on “outstanding traffic or misdemeanor warrants.” Id. There 
are also 52,235 pedestrians stopped in Newark in a four-year period resulting in 
39,308 warrant checks. Id. 
 151. See supra note 127. During the writing of this article, another of these 
1446 BUFFALO LAW REVIEW [Vol.  67 
complex problem and limiting the right to search incident to 
arrest will not solve it completely, it is a step toward reducing 
the incentives for police overzealousness. The fact that some 
evidence of crime may go undiscovered is simply a post-hoc 
rationalization for a bad rule. We do not tolerate searches for 
evidence in Terry cases and we should not tolerate them 
here. 
Third, the proposed limit on searches incident to arrest 
is a categorical rule, like those fashioned by the Court in 
Robinson and Belton.152 The officer may not search for 
evidence incident to arrest if it is impossible that she will find 
evidence of the offense of arrest. This is identical to the 
approach taken in Gant and it is as easy to follow, 
particularly when the officer is relying on a warrant for a 
minor offense.153 Of course the officer may still search for 
weapons incident to arrest and if in the process, she finds 
evidence in plain view or plain touch, i.e. whose evidentiary 
value is “immediately apparent,”154 she may seize it even if 
it is unrelated to the offense of arrest. 
Finally, since the Supreme Court’s decision in Terry, 
there has been an inexorable trend in its cases to expand the 
power of the police at the expense of individual privacy. In so 
doing, the Court has consistently valued the law enforcement 
interests over an individual’s liberty and privacy interests. It 
has adopted “categorical” rules in cases like Robinson, Belton 
and Atwater that do not factor in the circumstances of any 
 
incidents was reported in the press. Mihir Zaveri & Sandra E. Garcia, Phoenix 
Mayor Apologizes After Police Draw Guns on Family Over Report of Stolen Doll, 
N.Y. TIMES (June 16, 2019), available at https://www.nytimes.com/2019/06/16/us/ 
phoenix-police-brutality-lawsuit.html. 
 152. As the Gant Court noted, the clarity of categorical rules like Belton’s, 
which “generated a great deal of uncertainty,” has been overstated. Arizona v. 
Gant, 556 U.S. 332, 346 (2009). 
 153. Compare Robinson (fraudulent driver’s license), Gant (traffic offense), 
Herring (failure to appear) and Strieff (unpaid parking ticket) with Belton and 
Thornton (narcotics). In the former there is no authority to search. In the latter 
there is. 
 154. Minnesota v. Dickerson, 508 U.S. 366, 375 (1993). 
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individual case. It is time for the adoption of a categorical 
rule that limits the authority of the police to search incident 
to arrest.155 In the “no evidence of the offense of arrest” case, 
the law enforcement interest might be characterized as 
“taking a shot” that some evidence will be found at the 
expense of a significant intrusion on a person’s liberty and 
privacy.156 It is time for the pendulum to swing in the other 
direction.157 
As our recent history has made clear, the consequences 
of police interaction with the citizenry, especially in minority 
communities, sometimes has deadly consequences. Surely 
the off-chance the police will find evidence of serious crimes 
by arresting for minor offenses and searching for evidence 
unrelated to the minor offense is not worth even a single life. 
 
 155. See Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 761 (1969) (observing that the 
Fourth Amendment was adopted because “[t]he right of privacy was deemed too 
precious to entrust to the discretion of those whose job is the detection of crime 
and the arrest of criminals”). 
 156. As the Gant Court put it: 
It is particularly significant that Belton searches authorize police 
officers to search not just the passenger compartment but every purse, 
briefcase, or other container within that space. A rule that gives police 
the power to conduct such a search whenever an individual is caught 
committing a traffic offense, when there is no basis for believing evidence 
of the offense might be found in the vehicle, creates a serious and 
recurring threat to the privacy of countless individuals. 
Gant, 556 U.S. at 345. 
 157. There is some indication in cases like Riley that, especially in the digital 
age, the Court is becoming more sensitive to individual privacy concerns. See, 
e.g., Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206 (extending Fourth Amendment 
protection to data held by a third party); United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400 
(2012) (five members of the Court agreeing that extensive GPS monitoring of a 
suspect’s movements in public would violate societal privacy expectations). 
